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Abstract
This paper concerns the social and ritual construction of  social identities 
at Pondok Pesantren Madrasah Wathoniyah Islamiyah (PPMWI), a 
theologically Wahhabi oriented pesantren (traditional Islamic school) in 
Central Java, Indonesia. We focus on the inter-play of  religious and secular 
symbols in the school’s graduation ceremonies (wisuda) for secondary school 
students and the ways it contributes to the construction of  individual and social 
identities. Our analysis builds on Turner’s studies of  the processual logic of  
rites of  passage, Moore and Meyerhoff ’s distinction between religious and 
secular ritual and Tambiah’s application of  the Piercian concept of  indexical 
symbols to the analysis of  ritual. Theoretically we will be concerned with 
ritual, cognitive and social processes involved in the construction of  religious 
identities. Empirically, we critique the common assumption that Salafi, and 
more specifically, Wahhabi, religious teachings contribute to the construction of  
exclusivist identities, social conflict and violence. In the case we are concerned 
with, religious tolerance and non-violence are among the defining features of  
Wahhabi identity.
[Tulisan membahas konstruksi identitas ritual dan sosial pada sebuah 
pesantren yang berorientasi teologi Wahhabi, yaitu Pondok Pesantren 
Madrasah Wathoniyah Islamiyah (PPMWI). Diskusi akan difokuskan 
pada saling silang simbol-simbol agama dan sekuler dalam peringatan 
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wisuda siswa menengah pertama serta signifikansinya dalam konstruksi 
identitas sosial dan individual. Analisis tulisan ini berdasarkan studi 
Turner mengenai logika proses dalam daur ritus (the processual logic of  
rites of  passage), pembagian ritual agama dan sekuler oleh Moore dan 
Meyerhoff  serta konsep Piercian mengenai indek simbolis dalam ritual oleh 
Tambiah. Secara teoritis, artikel ini akan mendiskusikan ritual, kognisi, dan 
proses sosial yang menjadi bagian dalam konstruksi identitas agama. Selain 
itu, penulis juga melakukan kritik terhadap pandangan umum mengenai 
Wahhabi yang dituduh sebagai identitas ekslusif, biang-kerok konflik sosial 
dan kekerasan. Penulis menemukan sebaliknya, bahwa toleransi antar agama 
dan anti-kekerasan adalah salah satu ciri identitas Wahhabi.]
Keywords: Wahhabi, PPMWI, identity
A.  Introduction: Constructing Social Identities
There is a fundamental distinction between primordialist and 
constructivist approaches to the study of  ethnic, religious and other social 
identities. Primordialist approaches assume that social identities are based 
on principles that endure over time and are extremely resistant to change. 
Constructivisms share the view that change is a basic feature of  culture 
and religion. In a review of  the literature on identity and ethnic violence 
Fearon and Laitin contrast primordialist and constructivist approaches 
and conclude that the former have limited explanatory power.1 They 
distinguish between three constructivist approaches: The first emphasizes 
the logic of  cultural and discursive systems, the second elite manipulation 
and the third the manipulation and construction of  difference by “on 
the ground” social groups. They also note that despite the currency of  
the concept of  the “social construction of  identity” that there are few 
case studies focusing on the nature of  the process. One reason for the 
absence of  detailed case studies is that research by political scientists 
tends to be conducted at the macro-level focusing on the interaction 
groups engaged in national or regional level conflict and that conducted 
by social psychologists relies on laboratory experiments. Our research 
is situated between these poles in intellectual territory demarcated by 
1 D. Fearon and D, Laitin, “Violence and the Social Construction of  Ethnic 
Identity,” International Organization, vol. 54, no. 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 845–877.
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Barth, Lehman and other anthropologists concerned with the social 
construction of  ethnic categories.2 By focusing on a smaller, sub-ethnic 
religious community, we provide insight into the ways in which social 
identities are constructed in natural environments. We show that the 
constructivist approaches Fearon and Laitin describe are not mutually 
exclusive and argue that social identities emerge from the cognitive 
process Lévi-Strauss describes ‘bricolage.’
The French term bricolage referred originally to unforeseen events 
and subsequently to objects produced by craftsmen working with readily 
available tools and materials at. Lévi-Strauss uses it to describe processes 
through which abstract structural principles, or what Sperber would later 
call “symbolic knowledge,”3 are used in the interpretation of  nature and 
social relations and the construction of  mythological narratives. He 
describes the process as follows:
The characteristic feature of  mythological thought is that it expresses 
itself  by means of  a heterogeneous repertoire, which, even if  extensive, 
is never the less limited. It has to use this repertoire, however, whatever 
the task in hand because it has nothing else at its disposal. Mythological 
thought is therefore a kind of  intellectual ‘bricolage’—which explains the 
relation which can be perceived between the two. Like bricolage of  the 
technical plane, mythical reflection can reach brilliant unforeseen results 
on the intellectual plane.4
Jenkins argues that social identities define groups by identifying 
commonality and by referencing categories of  otherness.5 Here we argue 
that bricolage is among the means through which both are constructed 
and that ritual is among the means through which it operates. It is also 
among the social contexts in which individuals internalize the narratives, 
symbols and doctrines used by elites to define collective identities. The 
2 F. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries. The Organization of  Culture Difference (Long 
Grove: 1998 [1969]); F. Lehman, “Kayah Society as a Function of  the Shan-Burmese-
Karen Context,” Contemporary Change in Traditional Societies, volume I. Steward, J. (ed.) 
(Urbana: University of  Illinois Press, 1967), pp. 1-104.
3 D. Sperber, Rethinking Symbolism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1975), pp. 91-105.
4 C. Levi Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1966), 
p. 117.
5 R. Jenkins, Social Identities (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 85-87.
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distinction that Fearon and Laitin make between elites and “on the 
ground” social groups is also relative. With respect to students and their 
families, the pesantren’s religious leaders are elites, but in relationship to 
the larger society, the pesantren community is a social group.
B.  Muslim Schools, and Religious Movements in Southeast Asia
Pesantren are traditional Javanese Muslim schools. Originally they 
offered only religious education. Many began to teach secular subjects 
to offer an alternative to schools established by Christian missionaries 
and colonial governments in the early decades of  the twentieth century. 
Schools teaching a combination of  religious and secular subjects have 
figured significantly in the definition of  Muslim communities in Indonesia 
and elsewhere in Muslim Southeast Asia since the late nineteenth 
century.6 They have been vehicles for the dissemination of  modernist 
and fundamentalist theologies originating in Egypt and Arabia and 
for the modernization of  traditional Islam.7 Schools have also played 
important roles in the development of  Muslim social movements and 
of  which the Indonesian modernist Muhammadiyah and traditionalist 
Nadhlatul Ulama (Renaissance of  the Muslim Scholars – NU) are by far 
the largest. Today, there are at least 17,000 pesantren, most of  which are 
affiliated with NU in some way.8 There are, however, others, including 
6 For an overview of  Islamic education in Southeast Asia see: R. Hefner (ed.), 
Making Modern Muslims. The Politics of  Education in Southeast Asia (Honolulu: University 
of  Hawai’i Press, 2009). On pesantren see: Z. Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition: The Role 
of  the Kyai in the Maintenance of  Traditional Islam in Java (Tempe: Arizona State University 
Program for Southeast Asian Studies Monograph Series, 1999) and M. Woodward, 
A. Amin, I. Rohmaniyah and D. Coleman “Muslim Education, Celebrating Islam and 
Having Fun as Counter-Radicalization Strategies in Indonesia,” Perspectives on Terrorism, 
vol. 4, no. 4, 2010, pp. 28-50. 
7 The efforts of  modernists with neo-fundamentalist religious orientations to 
introduce modern education are well known. Those by traditionally oriented Muslim 
leaders and organizations have received less attention in the academic literature. R. 
Hefner, “Islamic Schools, Social Movements, and Democracy in Indonesia,” in R. 
Hefner (ed.), Making Modern Muslims. The Politics of  Islamic Education in Southeast Asia 
(Honolulu: University of  Hawai’i Press, 2009), pp. 55-105.
8 On Muhammadiyah see: M. Nakamura, The Crescent Rises Over the Banyan Tree: 
A Study for the Muhammadiyah Movement in an Indonesian Town (Athens: Ohio University 
Press, 1983); J. Peacock, Muslim Puritans, Reformist Psychology in Southeast Asia (Berkeley: 
University of  California Press, 1978) and on NU, G. Barton, and G. Fealy (eds), Nadhlatul 
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PPMWII that are not associated with larger organizations.9
Sociologically, the charismatic authority of  the kyai distinguishes 
pesantren from other Islamic schools, including those operated by 
Muhammadiyah. The kyai is the undisputed authority around which life in 
a pesantren revolves. His status is often compared with that of  a raja (king) 
in a traditional Javanese state. A kyai’s authority is based on a combination 
of  Islamic learning, acquired and inherited charisma. Most Javanese kyai 
are members of  a single extended family descending from the Prophet 
Muhammad and from the legendary Wali Songo (nine saints) who were 
instrumental in establishing Islam as the religion of  Java in the fifteenth 
century.10 There are very few kyai who are not part of  this sacred lineage.
Kyai are thought to be sources of  blessing (barakah) as well as 
knowledge. The bond between kyai and santri (students) is such that when 
asked to name an important religious authority, many Javanese Muslims 
reply with “my kyai.” People come to them to find healing and for advise 
on topics ranging from marriage and other important life choices, and 
even what to name their children. It is customary for students to kiss a 
kyai’s hand on greeting him or to touch his sleeve in hope of  securing 
blessing through physical contact. Even the dishes from which he has 
eaten and the water with which he performs ablutions is thought to be 
holy. Kyai families are widely regarded as aristocrats and as holy families. 
Their wives (nyai), sons (gus), daughters (ning) and even grandchildren of  
prominent kyai are also treated with respect and deference.
A broad distinction can be drawn between schools linked to NU 
(and similar ones elsewhere in Southeast Asia) and those associated 
with modernist/fundamentalist orientations such as Muhammadiyah in 
Indonesia and the Kaum Muda (Young Group) movement in Malaysia 
Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia (Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996).
9 On pesantren other than those associated with NU see M. van Bruinessen 
“Traditionalist and Islamist Pesantren in Contemporary Indonesia,” in F. Noor, Y. Sikand 
and M. van Bruinessen (eds), The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism and Transnational 
Linkages (Amsterdam: University of  Amsterdam Press, 2009), pp. 217-247.
10 On the Wali Songo see A. Gade, “Sunan Ampel of  the Javanese Wali Songo” 
in J. Renard, Tales of  God’s Friends: Islamic Hagiography in Translation (Berkeley: University 
of  California Press, 2009), pp. 341-358. On the importance of  kinship as a factor in 
religious leadership in Java see: Z. Dhofier, “Kinship and Marriage among the Javanese 
Kyai,” Indonesia, vol. 29, 1980, pp. 47-58.
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and Singapore.11 In both instances the combination of  “modern” subjects 
including science, technology, European languages and more recently 
the social sciences and religious ones, especially Quranic exegesis (tafsir), 
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), has been a driving force in the development 
of  Islamic education.
The theological differences dividing “traditional” and “modernist” 
schools and associated Muslim movements are, however, enormous 
and irreconcilable. Traditional Southeast Asian Islam is deeply rooted 
in sufism (Islamic mysticism) and in the charismatic authority of  saints, 
sultans and kyai (scholar-teachers.)12 It is characterized by devotional 
practices focusing on wasilah (intercession with God) including pilgrimage 
to the graves of  saints (ziarah) and prayers for the dead (tahlilan) in 
addition to the universally acknowledge pillars of  the faith including the 
five daily prayers, fasting during the month of  Ramadan and pilgrimage 
to Mecca. Modernist Islam is influenced by Salafi teachings that reject the 
notion of  wasilah and ritual practices associated with it and acknowledge 
only what Geertz terms “scripturalist” authority, the Qur’an and hadith.13 
These theological differences lead to the construction of  distinctive 
identities. Modernists understand themselves to have an unmediated 
relationship with God and to be entirely responsible for their own 
salvation. Traditionalists on the other hand have a more collectivist 
view of  religion and in which individuals are related to God through 
intermediaries including saints and teachers and the collective agency of  
their fellow Muslims.
PPMWI differs from NU based pesantren because it is based on 
Salafi and more specifically Wahhabi religious teachings. It differs from 
Muhammadiyah and other modernist schools because it is based on 
the charismatic authority of  a kyai family though without the mystical 
understanding of  their authority common in NU pesantren. Wahhabism 
11 On this distinction see: T. Abdullah, Schools and Politics. The Kaum Movement in 
West Sumatra (1927-1933) ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), pp. 57-84; R. Hasim, 
Educational Dualism in Malaysia: Implications for Theory and Practice (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), pp. 5-36 and D. Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 
1900-1942 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 101-115.
12 M. Woodward, Java, Indonesia and Islam (New York: Springer, 2011), pp. 118-121.
13 C. Geertz, Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago: 
University of  Chicago Press, 1971), pp. 56-90.
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is a form of  Salafism based on the teachings of  Muhammad Ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab (1703-1792) whose thinking was derivative of  that of  the 13th 
-14th century jurist Ibn Tamiyyah (1263-1328).14 It emphasizes literal, 
rather than metaphorical or contextual, readings of  the Qur’an and hadith 
(traditions concerning the words and deeds of  the Prophet Muhammad) 
and uncompromising interpretation of  the Islamic principle of  tawh}i>d 
(the unity or oneness of  God). In Western and Indonesian Salafism and 
especially Wahhabism are commonly associated with violence, intolerance, 
bigotry and misogyny and with the imagination of  the de-culturized, 
ahistorical and neo-fundamentalist Islam Roy describes as characteristic 
of  the transnational social movement he refers to as the “New Global 
Ummah.”15
To understand the variety of  Salafisms it is, however, necessary to 
distinguish between those that reject local cultures and associate Islamic 
“purity” the Arab, and particularly Saudi Arabian social and cultural 
practices and others that combine Wahhabi or other Salafi religious 
teachings with them.16 We refer to the former as “domesticated” and the 
later as “Saudi” Salafism. PPMWI is based on an Indonesian nationalist 
domesticated Salafism.
C.  Pondok Pesantren Madrasah Wathoniyah Islamiyah (PPMWI)
PPMWI is located in Kebarongan, Banyumas in the province 
of  Central Java. It is a mid sized pesantren with approximately 1,500 
students.17 It was founded by Kyai Habib Muhammad, a member of  a 
14 On Wahhabi religious teachings see: M. Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding 
Wrong in Islamic Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 165-191 and De Long-
Bas, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2004), p. 41-92. 
15 The assumption that Wahhabism is linked with violence is common in 
both Western and Indonesian discourse. See: D. Gold, Hatred’s Kingdom: How Saudi 
Arabia Supports the New Global Terror (Washington DC: Regency Publishing, 2003), p. 
89-124. Indonesian examples include: Saidiman,“The Wahhabis Inferiority,” Jaringan 
Islam Liberal, http://islamlib.com/en/article/the-wahhabis-inferiority/ (accessed 
03/26/2010). A. Wahid (ed.), Ilusi Negara Islam. Expansi Gerakan Islam Transnasional di 
Indonesia (Jakarta: LibForAll Foundation, 2009), p. 59-132.
16 M. Woodward, Muslim Education, p. 36-38. 
17 Some pesantren have only a handful of  students. Pondok Pesantren Lirboyo in 
Kediri, East Java is the largest with more than 20,000.
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well established kyai family, in 1878. He studied at Pesantren Somalangu 
in neighboring Kebumen and then for more than two decades in Mecca 
before founding the pesantren that would become PPMWI.18 It was 
originally a traditional pesantren at which there were only male students 
and that taught only religious subjects. Girls were accepted as students 
in the early twentieth century when formal education for girls was rare.
The pesantren has been strongly nationalist since the early twentieth 
century. It was associated with the first Indonesian Muslim nationalist 
movement Sarekat Islam (founded 1912), several of  whose leaders 
including Tjokroamintono and Agus Salim, visited Kebarongan to 
meet with its kyai.19 Kyai Abdullah Zawawi, one of  Kyai Habib’s sons 
established a local branch of  Sarekat Islam. He also transformed the 
pesantren along modernist lines, introducing formal classes and a modern 
curriculum for which Indonesian, the language of  nationalism, not 
Javanese, the language of  culture, or Arabic, the language of  religion was 
the medium of  instruction in 1916. The modern curriculum also included 
Dutch, the language of  colonialism. By 1930 it was attracting students 
from throughout Java and from British Malaya and Singapore.20 During 
the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) and the Indonesian Revolution 
(1945-1949) members of  the pesantren community were actively involved 
in anti-colonial struggles. Unlike many other kyai, those at PPMWII did 
not become deeply involved in postcolonial Indonesian politics, choosing 
instead to concentrate on the school’s teaching mission. 
When and how the pesantren acquired its Wahhabi orientation is 
uncertain because there is no documentary evidence. There are three 
bodies of  oral tradition that agree on the nature of  the process, but not 
on the date or the kyai responsible for taking this step. All mention a 
18 Pesantren Somalangu was established by Syech As-Sayyid Abdul Kahfi Al 
Hasani, a Hadrami (Yemini) sayyid (descendant of  the Prophet Muhammad) who came 
to Java from Syriain 1475. He was associated with two of  the Wali Songo, Sunan Ampel 
and Sunan Kudus. Kyai Habib’s wife was one of  the Syech’s descendants. This locates 
PPMWI in one of  the oldest and most distinguished kyai families in Java.
19 L. Assyakanie, Islam and the Secular State in Indonesia (Singapore: Institute for 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2009), p. 37-42 and R. Van Neil, The Emergence of  the Modern 
Indonesian Elite (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1960), pp. 290-295.
20 Indonesian pesantren, modernist Muslim schools and salafi madrasa continue to 
attract students from Malaysia and Singapore because government regulation of  religion 
in those countries restricts the range of  Muslim education available.
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kyai who left rural Banyumas for a center of  Muslim learning, “returned 
with tawh}i>d” and established it as the school’s guiding principle. One 
attributes this step to Kyai Habib. We think that this is unlikely because 
Javanese Islam was overwhelmingly sufi in the nineteenth century. The 
second is that Kyai Habib sent three of  his sons to study in Mecca early 
in the twentieth century. Two of  them returned as sufis but the third, Kyai 
Abdullah Zawawi, brought tawh}i>d to Banyumas. He succeeded his father 
as kyai while his two brothers established their own pesantren. The third 
attributes the transformation to Kyai Asifuddin Zawawi, the youngest 
son of  Kyai Abdullah Zawawi who discovered tawh}i>d, while living in 
Batavia (Jakarta) during the Japanese occupation. The second and third 
variants are equally plausible and are congruent with broader patterns 
in the development of  Indonesian Islamic modernism. Whoever was 
responsible for this move did not, however, alter the pesantren’s Javanese 
cultural orientation. It is also significant that this theological shift was 
the result of  an internally driven transformation based on traditional 
patterns of  kyai authority. It is in this respect radically different from 
the Saudi influenced and financed spread of  Wahhabi teachings and 
cultural practices that involved radical breaks with tradition that began 
in the 1980s.
Today PPMWII is politically nationalist, committed to democratic 
governance, religious pluralism and gender equity and is as deeply rooted 
in Javanese Muslim culture as it is in Wahhabi teachings.21Al-Wahhab’s 
understanding of  tawh}i>d that makes humans solely responsible for their 
own actions and denies the possibility of  wasilah is the central feature 
of  the pesantren’s identity. This places PPMWII at odds with most other 
pesantren on theological grounds and leads them to reject ritual practices, 
including pilgrimage to the tomb of  the founding kyai that is a central 
feature of  social identity at other pesantren. Indonesian “Saudi Salafis” 
and modernists organizations including Muhammadiyah share these 
views. NU interprets tawh}i>d differently, and understands wasilah and 
associated pilgrimage traditions as being among the essential tenets of  
Islam. PPMWI holds Wahhabi views on tawh}i>d, but in other respects is 
21 For an analysis of  pesantren with similar social and political agendas oriented 
in traditional sufi understandings of  Islamic theology see F. Pohl, Islamic Education and 
the Public Sphere: Today’s Pesantren in Indonesia (Bonn: WaxmannVerlag GmbH, 2009), 
pp. 117-125. 
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similar to NU based pesantren. Continued insistence on the importance 
of  the kyai, which is central to NU and absent in Muhammadiyah is 
one example. Another is use of  the “bedug,” a large drum made from a 
hollowed log to accompany the azan (call to prayer). Every NU pesantren 
and mosque has a bedug. Muhammadiyah and most other Salafi groups 
reject it as bid’ah (unacceptable innovation). PPMWII continues many 
other Javanese Muslim practices, including torch lit processions on the 
evening before Id al Fitr at the end of  Ramadan, asking forgiveness from 
neighbors, relatives and friends on the morning of  the Id, and enjoying 
popular music that Saudi-Wahhabis find objectionable. That fact that it 
is “not NU and not Muhammadiyah” is another central component of  
PPMWII’s collective identity. 
The pesantren strongly rejects terrorism and other forms of  political 
violence, considering them to be based on misinterpretations of  both the 
Qur’an and Muslim history. Kyai Fata Mu’min, who led the pesantren until 
his untimely death in June 2012, explained that Wahhabi teachings lead 
students to develop a strong faith, embrace forbearance, pray sincerely 
and partake in other forms positive, non-violent conduct. He stressed the 
point that genuine Wahhabi teachings forbid the harassment or killing of  
other Muslims. Students discovered engaging in radical political activity 
are treated in the same way as those found violating other principles of  
moral order such as drinking alcohol or using drugs. They are expelled. 
This aspect of  PPMWI’s collective identity and the individual identities 
it seeks to foster in students is defined in opposition to the category 
“Wahhabi-terrorist” that has become a significant theme in Indonesian 
religious and political discourse.
Students wear uniforms similar to those used in government run 
secular Indonesian schools. There are several styles, worn on alternate 
days. One resembles scout uniforms; another is Javanese batik, reflecting 
the school’s nationalist and cultural orientations. Arab style robes (juba) 
and the “short pants and long beards” for men and niqab (face veils) for 
women, that have become iconic of  Saudi-Wahhabism and Islamism, are 
nowhere to be seen. Women cover their hair in fashionable ways common 
for middle class Indonesians. PPMWI makes a clear distinction between 
religion and culture, including Arab as well as Javanese culture. Culture 
is, for religious purposes, irrelevant. By default this makes Javanese 
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culture normative because the faculty and almost all of  the students are 
Javanese, and the adaptation of  Arabic cultural norms unnecessary. It also 
takes the position that the state does not have the authority or the right 
to establish an official orthodoxy because to do so would discriminate 
against citizens of  other religious orientations. It is not affiliated with any 
mass organization or political party. PPMWI also does not engage in takfiri 
rhetoric (denouncing professed Muslims as non-believers) and maintains 
cordial relationships with other Muslim, and non-Muslim groups.
Like most pesantren, PPMWI offers a government approved secular 
curriculum that enables students to sit for university entrance exams.22 
It also offers the government Islamic curriculum so general as to be 
acceptable to Muslims of  most sectarian orientations and PPMWI’s 
own Islamic curriculum that focuses on Wahhabi treatises on tawh}i>d. It 
stresses instruction in both Arabic and English.
Fath} al-Maji>d (The Enlightenment of  the Glorious), a commentary 
on al-Wahhab’s Kita>b Tawh}i>d (Book of  Tawh}i>d) by his son Abdul Rahman 
bin Hassan al Sheik (1780-1869) is the core of  the PPMWI religious 
curriculum.23 Only PPMWI’s most senior scholars are permitted to 
teach this text. They rely exclusively on the Arabic original because they 
doubt the accuracy of  Indonesian translations. Their explanations locate 
al-Wahhab’s understanding of  tawh}i>d in an exegetical frame shaped by 
PPMWI’s other foundational principles. The result is an understanding 
of  Islam very different from NU based pesantren and those of  other 
Indonesian groups including the Islamist party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 
(PKS, The Justice and Prosperity Party) and Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(MMI, Indonesian Jihad Fighter’s Council) that rely on this text, but locate 
it in exegetical frames rooted in combinations of  religious exclusivism 
and political activism derivative of  the combination of  Saudi-Wahhabi 
orthodoxy and Muslim Brotherhood activism.24 The most important of  
22 On the integration of  secular and religious curricula in pesantren see: R.A. 
Lukens-Bull, Peaceful Jihad: Negotiating Identity and Modernity in Muslim Java (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 1-24. 
23 Salafis throughout the world consider Fath} al-Maji>d to be an authoritative work.
24 See: M. Woodward, A. Amin , I. Rohmaniyah, and C. Lundry “Getting Culture: 
A New Path for Indonesia’s Islamist Justice and Prosperity Party?,” Contemporary Islam, 
Feb. 2012, p. 1-17. The combination of  Wahhabi puritanism and Muslim Brotherhood 
activism was an outgrowth of  the flight of  Muslim Brotherhood intellectuals to Saudi 
Inayah Rohmaniyah & Mark Woodward
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 50, No. 1, 2012 M/1433 H130
these differences are that the PPMWI variant of  Wahhabism embraces 
religious and cultural diversity. 
Kyai Fata Mu’min was actively involved in inter-faith dialog and 
in conversations with other Muslim leaders. Early in 2011 he explained 
that based on his study of  “world religions” he could find good in all 
of  them. PPMWI also rejects the position that there is a link between 
Wahhabi religious teachings and violence. Writing in the pesantren’s in 
house magazine Buletin Wathoni, Kyai Ahmad Janan Asifudin stated: 
PPMWI has used Fath} al-Maji>d as a basic work for a long time. The 
reason is not that PPMWI is fanatical or blindly follows the teachings 
of  Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab. …. It is because in Fath} al-Maji>d that 
we find examples of  the ways in which the Prophet and his companions 
practiced tawh}i>d, whereas other works are theoretical, approaching it from 
the standpoint of  theology or philosophy. In other words, theoretical 
discussions of  tawh}i>d are important, but we cannot stop with theory. Fath} 
al-Maji>d includes only selections from the Qur’an and hadith and exegesis 
concerning the nature of  tawh}i>d. This is very far from the terrorist agenda. 
People who say that Fath} al-Maji>d promotes terrorism definitely do not 
understand its content or have not yet read it carefully enough. We do 
not study Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab’s political activities. That is 
another matter.25
This discussion of  Fath} al-Maji>d clarifies important elements of  the 
pesantren’s social identity. It is illustrative of  the ways in which PPMWII 
distinguishes between religion and politics. It is al-Wahhab’s theology and 
not his politics that is fundamental. Kyai Ahmad comments on culture in 
the same article. He states that Islam is not “anti-culture” and that only 
those aspects of  culture in conflict with religious teachings should be 
rejected and that others should be supported. He refers to the Quranic 
injunction to al-’amr bi’l-ma’ruf  wa nahy ’an-l-munkar is (command the good 
Arabia from other Middle Eastern countries to avoid persecution beginning in the 1950s. 
It gave rise to politically militant forms of  Wahhabism including the Sahwa movement 
in Saudi Arabia and has contributed to shaping Islamist ideologies in Indonesia and 
elsewhere in Southeast Asia. T. Hegghammer and S. Lacroix “Rejectionist Islamism in 
Saudi Arabia: The Story of  Juhayman al-Utaybi Revisited,” International Journal of  Middle 
East Studies, vol. 39,2007, pp. 103–122.
25 “InovasiVisi Yayasan Pomesmawi/PPMWI dan Beberapa Kenyataan-
Tantangan di Lapangan (Catatan dari Pertemuan Tg. 29 Juni 2010,” Buletin Wathoni, 
September 2010.
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and forbid the evil) a proposition that few Muslims would disagree with.26 
Questions about what exactly are the good that Muslims are obligated 
to command and the evils they must forbid and how to balance these 
principles are, however, topics of  contentious debate. In general PPMWII 
emphasizes commanding the good as a strategy for establishing moral 
order. He concludes by stating that abandoning culture would impoverish 
the Muslim community. This affirms the importance of  culture in the 
construction of  the pesantren’s identity and differentiates it from other 
Indonesian groups that combine Wahhabi theology with the rejection 
of  local culture.
PPMWII maintains a clear separation between secular and religious 
subjects. While the religious curriculum is fixed, secular instruction 
changes in correspondence with educational needs. Secular subjects 
are, however, understood as being religious in the ultimate sense for 
two reasons. The first is that all knowledge originates with God. The 
second is that knowledge of  creation is also knowledge of  God. This 
eliminates concern about the “Islamicization of  knowledge” evident in 
some Indonesian Muslim schools and pervasive in neighboring Malaysia.27 
There is no need to “Islamicize” what is by definition Islamic. PPMWI 
is globally oriented and has placed graduates at prestigious secular 
universities in the United States and Canada, equally prestigious Muslim 
universities in Egypt and Saudi Arabia as well as secular and Islamic 
universities in Indonesia. Few graduates become religious scholars. 
Most find employment in the private or public sector. They include 
construction workers, teachers, engineers, shopkeepers, lawyers, computer 
specialists, research biologists, civil servants, university professors and 
entrepreneurs, to name few. There is very little, other than distinctive 
understandings of  tawh}i>d that distinguishes them from other Indonesian 
Muslims. Many students are not fully aware of  the “Wahhabi” foundations 
of  their religious education. Several alumnae interviewed in 2012 could 
not remember the title, much less the sectarian orientation, of  Fath} al-
Maji>d. Most, but not all, come to accept this understanding of  Islam but 
do not think of  themselves as “Wahhabis” in the way that the term is 
26 See Qur’an (3:110). 
27 On debates concerning the “Islamization of  knowledge” in Malaysia see: 
M. Abaza, Debates on Islam and Knowledge in Malaysia and Egypt: Shifting Worlds (London: 
Routledge, 2002), pp. 86-105.  
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commonly used in the West and in Indonesia. In general PPMWI and 
the community it sustains is, in a sociological sense, everything that Roy’s 
“New Global Ummah” is not. 
D. PPMWI and the Construction of  Social Identity
Pesantren education involves more than the transmission of  
knowledge. It seeks to inculcate religious values as the basis of  a type 
personal identity Smith and Woodward have described as the “pesantren 
self ” and to establish and maintain what Durkheim called a “moral 
community” both of  which are based on student/teacher bonds and 
shared religious knowledge acquired through the pesantren experience.28 
This community, the social relations and religious principles on which 
it is based, is constitutive and regulatory. It provides both a sense of  
community and a moral compass. The pesantren self  is what Mead terms 
a “me,” an integrated personality defined in reference to the “generalized 
other” of  the pesantren moral community and differentiated from 
individual and collective others.29
Tawh}i>d is the defining characteristic of  PPMWI identity. When 
asked to speak about the pesantren’s core values, faculty, students and 
alumnae nearly always describe it as the most important. Others include 
nationalism, pluralism, Javanese culture, non-violence and gender equity. 
These values are inculcated through formal education, study groups 
devoted to religious topics and communal life and ritual performance. The 
construction of  PPMWI is a directed process, guided by the kyai family.
Wisuda, a secular ritual, combines all of  elements. Its purpose is 
to mark and accomplish the transition from student to alumnae and to 
reinforce the solidarity of  the moral community. This is accomplished 
through the incorporation of  indexical symbols that point towards the 
defining characteristics of  PPMWI identity into a performative core based 
on what was originally a Western secular rite of  passage.
28 On these concepts see L. Tole, “Durkheim on Religion and Moral Community 
in Modernity,” Sociological Inquiry, vol. 63, No.1, 1993, p. 1-29 and B. Smith, And M. 
Woodward, “De-colonizing Islam and Muslim Feminism” in B. Smith and M. Woodward 
(eds), Re-orienting Muslim Gender: Leaders, Feminists, Sufis and Pesantren Selves in Indonesia 
(London: Routledge in press, 2013).
29 G. H. Mead, Mind, Self  and Society from the Standpoint of  a Social Behaviorist 
(Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 1956), p. 158.
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Moore and Myerhoff  broke new ground in the study of  ritual 
by calling attention to the ways in which what Turner calls “the ritual 
process” is not restricted to religion. They observe ritual need not take 
religious cosmology as a point of  reference. They argue that theoretical 
approaches developed for the study of  religious ritual can be used 
in the analysis of  secular performances and that in both secular and 
religious settings ritual is among the means through which social order is 
established and maintained. In many modern secular societies as well as in 
traditional religious ones, ritual is among the means through which social 
identities are constructed. Graduation ceremonies are among the most 
common secular rituals and can be found in almost all modern societies. 
Moore and Myerhoff  also point to the fact that while ritual 
generally has a stable purpose it also “alludes to more than it says.”30To 
elucidate the nature of  these symbolic allusions we rely on Stanley 
Tambiah’s application of  Pierce’s concept of  “duplex structures” to 
the analysis of  ritual symbols. This construct enables us to explain the 
localization and Islamicization of  graduation ceremonies and their use 
as vehicles for communicating the ideological and theological synthesis 
on which PPMWI identity is based.
Tambiah builds on Pierce’s concept of  duplex structures to explain 
the interplay of  continuity and change in ritual performance. Tambiah 
applies this approach in his analysis of  relationships between political, 
religious and social dimensions of  ritual. The same line of  reasoning 
is can be employed in the analysis of  the localization of  global secular 
performance events, including graduations. Indexical symbols are among 
the duplex structures included Pierce’s semiological system.31 Indexical 
symbols are signs that may be interpreted simultaneously as symbols that 
communicate universal meanings and as indexes standing in existential 
pragmatic relationship with the objects they represent. The “symbolic” 
half  of  an index ical symbol conveys abstract meaning. Its “indexical” 
component links that meaning with a particular person, group, or social 
30 S. Moore and B. Myerhoff, Secular Ritual (Assen: von Gorcum, 1977), pp. 
3-24, 5.
31 S. Tambiah, Culture, Thought, and Social Action: An Anthropological Perspective 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 132-168. On Pierce’s theory of  duplex 
structures see: G. Deledalle, S. Charles, Peirce’s Philosophy of  Signs: Essays in Comparative 
Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), pp. 120-127.
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role. Tambiah argues that the use of  indexical symbols in religious ritual 
modulates the interplay of  systems of  belief, that is, intellectual systems 
concerned with universals, with pragmatic dimensions of  social life. 
Woodward shows that in Java they are used to establish royal authority 
by linking the Sultan and the palace with highly valued modes of  Muslim 
religious practice including the veneration of  the Prophet Muhammad. 
Here we show how the deployment of  indexical symbols in secular ritual 
can be used to establish connections between global and local concepts 
and institutions in ways that aid in the construction of  seamless identities 
– in this case a community and individuals who see themselves as modern, 
educated Javanese Indonesian Muslims who define relationships between 
humanity and divinity in terms of  al-Wahhab’s interpretation of  tawh}i>d.
E. Wisuda at PPMWI: Rites of  Passage and Indexical Symbols
Wisuda or Western style graduation ceremonies have become an 
important part of  Indonesian educational culture. Graduates from pre-
school to graduate school levels don caps and gowns to receive official 
recognition of  their accomplishments and then pose for photos with 
family and friends to memorialize them. There is nothing exceptional 
about a pesantren staging graduation exercises. In 2012 PPPWI held its 
wisuda on 24 June. In most respects, there was nothing remarkable about 
it. Other Indonesians and people from diverse cultures across the globe 
would have seen it as just another graduation that only participants would 
find particularly interesting. The unremarkable character of  this event is, 
however, an example of  the way in which Wahhabi religious teachings 
can be integrated into cultural and social formations very different from 
those generally associated with “Wahhabism.” 
Graduations are rites of  passage. They mark the transition for 
being a student to the next stage of  life, whatever that may be. Victor 
Turner has observed that rites of  passage typically include three distinct 
phases: separation, in which previously existing social bonds are dissolved, 
flowed by a period of  liminality in which initiates receive instruction, and 
reintegration where they assume new social roles. For Turner, the liminal 
period is the most significant of  the three. He observes that during this 
period status distinctions are dissolved; that initiates often wear costumes 
that mask personal identities. In the final phase they symbolically take 
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up a new set of  social roles and responsibilities. The PPMWII wisuda 
follows this pattern in most respects, the exception being that gender 
distinctions are maintained in the liminal period.
The separation phase begins with the construction of  a ritual 
space in the courtyard in front of  the pesantren mosque. This involves the 
erection of  a canopy, the installation of  a temporary stage and a public 
address system and the placement of  chairs. It concludes with santri 
wearing graduation regalia, faculty, family and guests enter and assume 
their positions. The pesantren drum band performs at this point. Santri wear 
trans-national academic regalia including caps and gowns recognizable 
as “graduation attire” nearly anywhere. As is similar ceremonies across 
the country, female graduates wear headscarves (jilbab) underneath their 
caps. They are seated facing the stage. Family and guests sit behind them. 
Faculty do not wear academic regalia, but the same types of  clothing they 
usually do in the conduct of  their responsibilities at the pesantren. Parents 
and other guests wear varied styles appropriate for ceremonial occasions. 
Some men wear suites and ties typically associated with modernist Islam, 
others trousers and “Muslim” shirts and still others sarong and “Muslim” 
shirts associated with traditional Islam. Women wear either Javanese 
batik or contemporary Indonesian “Muslim” fashion.32 All women wear 
headscarves and none wear niqab. Younger students wearing pesantren 
uniforms crowd around the borders of  the ritual space. The contrast 
between uniformed santri and adults in normal attire symbolizes the 
distinction between santri and alumnae with the soon to be graduates 
occupying an intermediate, liminal position.
The liminal phase was marked by speeches in which students were 
congratulated on their accomplishments and admonished to live moral 
and productive lives and the presentation of  diplomas. Each student 
shook hands with school leaders as she or he received a diploma, known 
in Indonesia by the Arabic term ijazah.33 There were also awards and a 
32 Suites and ties have been associated with Muhammadiyah since the early 20th 
century. Sarong and long tailed, collarless shirts are associated with NU. On contemporary 
Indonesian Muslim fashion see E. Amrullah, “Indonesian Fashion Styles and Designs,” 
ISIM Review, vol. 22, no. 1, 2008, pp. 22-25.
33 The use of  the term ijazah as a translation for diploma establishes a 
correspondence between western and traditional Islamic education. An ijazah, in the 
traditional sense, is not the same as a diploma. It does not indicate completion of  a 
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musical performance. Proud parents and friends snapped photos with 
cameras and hand phones and there were professional video shooting 
teams. This is the ritual core of  school graduation and is almost the 
same wherever it is found, though the combination of  academic caps 
and headscarves is less common in Western countries than in Indonesia.
The reintegration phase consist of  an address by the director of  the 
PPMWI Madrasah Aliyah who spoke in terms remarkably similar to those 
Turner used in his theoretical discussion of  rites of  passage. He told the 
new graduates that they were no longer santri (students) at the pesantren 
and had become members of  the family of  alumnae. In Indonesia this 
social role is more important than in many Western societies. Graduates 
of  secular schools, as well as pesantren, continue to define themselves in 
terms of  ties with the schools they attended. There is a formal PPMWI 
alumnae group, but informal ties are more significant. Many alumnae 
send their children to the pesantren for the same combination of  religious 
and secular education they received. Many contribute financially and visit 
either the pesantren itself, or members of  the kyai family on Lebaran (Id al-
Fitri) at the end of  the fasting month of  Ramadan, or at times when they 
are in need of  spiritual guidance or counseling. For PPMWII graduates, 
the pesantren is especially significant as a source of  collective identity 
because it is the center of  a small and distinct religious community.
1. Indexical Symbols
Indexical symbols included in wisuda at PPMWII link the ritual core 
emphasizing the place of  the pesantren in the global system of  academic 
degrees and titles to local religious, cultural and political discourse 
systems and social-cultural practice. There were no explicit references to 
tawh}i>d other than an admonition to avoid shirk (associating other beings 
and powers with God) that is the opposite of  tawh}i>d in a speech by one 
of  the teachers. Further symbolic references to this concept were not 
required because it is central to the community’s identity. There were five 
sets of  indexical symbols linking the wisuda to sacred space, concepts of  
gender relations, the nexus of  Islam, nationalism, globalism and culture 
course of  study, but rather mastery of  a particular religious text, and authority to teach 
it. It places the recipient in a line of  teachers and students, while a diploma certifies that 
the recipient has completed a course of  study defined by an institution. In Indonesia 
ijazah refers to both modes of  accreditation. 
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that defines the pesantren’s educational agenda, the moral community 
including the kyai family, students and alumnae and Indonesian Muslim 
youth culture.
2. Sacred Space
The wisuda is held in a space also used for congregational prayers 
on Muslim holy days. The mosque is hidden from view during the wisuda, 
but is present in the memories of  participants. It presence lends an aura 
of  sacristy to an ostensively secular event as the Muslim moral community 
defined by the pesantren assembles for a secular ritual that carries it forward 
in time. The Muslim salutation Assala>mu alaikum wa-Rah}matulla>hi wa-
Baraka>tuh (Peace be unto you and so may the mercy and blessing of  God) 
is recited at the beginning of  every speech. This is common practice at 
public events, even those that are not explicitly religious. Together these 
elements of  wisuda locate it in a Muslim geographic, social and discursive 
space particular to PPMWI.
3. Gender
As is generally true in Muslim contexts, sacred space is gendered. 
It is characterized by shari>‘ah based gender separation as understood at 
PPMWI. Males and females are seated separately on either side of  an 
aisle in full view of  one another. Both male and female students received 
their ijazah from and shook hands with male teachers. The Master 
of  Ceremonies was a young woman. Musical performances and the 
valedictory addresses were also by gender integrated groups. Female and 
male students mixed freely and posed for photographs together after the 
ceremonies. This combination of  gender segregation and inclusion is in 
keeping with daily practice at PPMWI. Male and female students sit on 
opposite sides of  gender-integrated classrooms. The drum bands and 
even the karate club are gender inclusive. In contrast at the Saudi-Wahhabi 
oriented Imam Bukhari Madrasa there is total gender segregation with 
separate classrooms and even mosques for males and females. Virtually 
no contact between male and female students is allowed. Even in many 
NU oriented pesantren gender segregation is stricter than at PPMWII. 
Many have a common curriculum, but separate classes for male and 
female students who rarely encounter each other inside the pesantren. At 
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Lirboyo, the only males allowed inside the walled women’s quarters where 
female students live and study are teachers, fathers and brothers. In Saudi 
Arabia, education is completely segregated and there are restrictions on 
the subjects that female students can study. At PPMWI girls are actively 
encouraged to follow their own interests in the pursuit of  both religious 
and secular knowledge.
F. Islam, Nationalism, Globalization and Culture
These themes are basic elements of  the curriculum and culture 
of  PPMWII. They articulated in valedictory addresses by high achieving 
graduates. There are four, one in each of  the languages associated 
with these themes: Arabic, Indonesian, English and Javanese. Arabic 
is the language of  Islam, Indonesian that of  nationalism, English of  
globalization and Javanese of  culture. They were delivered in that order. 
In 2012 he tone of  the first three was formal and serious. The final 
address was humorous, in keeping with the style typical of  pesantren. 
This is an important distinction within Javanese Muslim culture. 
Modernist and Islamist religious talks (pengajian) tend to be formal and 
serious, consisting of  a combination of  quotations from the Qur’an and 
hadith and commentaries on them. While these elements are present in 
traditionalist discourse, it also uses combinations of  stories, personal 
anecdotes and jokes to make religious points. Here again, the culture 
of  PPMWII is closer to that of  the traditional pesantren than to other 
Indonesian modernist and Salafi communities. Few in the audience and 
not all of  the graduates understood the Arabic and English addresses. 
What is important is not so much the content, but rather the symbolic 
significance of  the use of  languages that point to communities and 
discourse systems beyond the borders of  the pesantren community. The use 
of  these linguistic conventions makes the point that the PPMWII moral 
community is engaged with and is a component of  these larger systems.
G. The Moral Community
At the end of  the reintegration phase of  the wisuda graduates swear 
an oath to devote themselves to the principles of  the pesantren. This 
marks the completion of  their transformation from santri to alumnae 
and defines responsibilities associated with that identity:
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There is no God but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of  God.
I accept the obligation to place absolute trust in God, the Lord of  all 
creation.
I will not engage in contentious discourse that would divide the Muslim 
community, as this is clearly forbidden by God and his Prophet.
I accept the obligation to guard the honor and good name of  the pesantren 
and to maintain relationships with it and the alumnae.
I accept the obligation to participate in the development of  the pesantren 
and the nation as a whole through good deeds that God loves.
The oath begins with the shahada (confession of  faith) that is the 
first of  the five pillars of  Islam. The second uses the Arabic term taqwa 
or absolute trust in God. This is a reference to the deep faith that the 
pesantren seeks to cultivate in santri and amplifies the first statement. The 
final three are more complex. The fourth statement speaks to issues 
of  Muslim unity, and of  avoiding conflict with other Muslims. This is 
an implicit disavowal of  takfiri rhetoric. The fifth speaks of  continued 
participation in the moral community defined by the pesantren. The final 
statement suggests a combination of  loyalty to and support for both the 
pesantren and the nation through pious acts.
H. Indonesian Muslim Youth Culture
The wisuda concluded with a shalawat performance. Shalawat is a 
genre of  sufi devotional music praising the Prophet Muhammad and his 
family. The denunciation of  music, and especially sufi devotional music is 
characteristic of  Saudi-Wahhabism and of  Indonesian Muslim movements 
associated with it, but not PPMWII. Here, many musical genres including 
Indonesian and American pop as well as Islamic devotional music are part 
of  daily life. A mixed gender duet accompanied by rabana (tambourines) 
performed S|olatun Bi Salamin at the 2012 wisuda. It describes the Prophet 
Muhammad as having been a prophet prior to the moment of  creation. 
This and many other shalawat are based on the sufi teachings of  Ibn al 
Arabi (1165-1240) for whom tawh}i>d led to the doctrine of  the “unity of  
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being” and the identification of  the divine essence and the human soul.34 
Nothing could be further from the PPMWII understanding of  tawh}i>d. 
Shalawat has figured significantly in the religious lives of  traditional 
Javanese Muslims for centuries. The Yogyakarta kraton (palace) has 
shalawat texts dating to the early eighteenth century. Shalawat is an almost 
daily practice in NU communities. Since 2005 it has entered the realm of  
Indonesian popular culture, largely due to the enormous popularity of  
the Javanese-Hadrami performer Habib Syech bin Abulkadir Assegaf. 
Habib Syech has achieved “rock star” status. His performances attract 
crowds as large as 300,000 most of  them young people. His recordings 
are regularly played at mosques prior to evening prayers, and can be heard 
and purchased as shrines throughout Java, and as far away as Malaysia 
and Singapore.
S|olatun Bi Salamin is his most popular recording.35 Many Indonesians 
say that “everyone” knows it. Because it is in Arabic, few understand 
the theological message of  the lyrics. It has, however, become almost 
the “Muslim national anthem” of  Indonesia. It goes without saying that 
most Wahhabi oriented Indonesians find the emergence of  shalawat as 
a popular expression of  Muslim piety to be disturbing, to say the least. 
PPMWII is an exception. S}olatun Bi Salamin is accepted not because of  
its theological content but because it is a popular expression of  Muslim 
piety – and a very good song. 
Taken together the indexical symbols included in the wisuda 
express and are intended to contribute to the construction of  personal 
and collective identities entirely different than those that the literature 
on Wahhabism, Salafism and the “New Global Ummah” would predict. 
Collectively they refer to a moral community rooted in Abd al-Wahhab’s 
understanding of  tawh}i>d that is inclusivist, nationalist and deeply rooted 
in Indonesian and Javanese Muslim cultures.
I. Conclusions: Reflections on Identity, Theology and Violence
PPMWI is a particularly significant case for testing the hypothesis set 
34 On Ibn al-Arabi see W. Chittick, The Sufi Path of  Knowledge Ibn al-Arabi’s 
Metaphysics of  Imagination (Albany: State University of  New York Press, 1989), pp. 15-28 
and on the role of  his teachings in Southeast Asian Islam, M. Woodward, Java, Indonesia 
and Islam (New York: Springer 2010, pp. 137-167. 
35 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BdEy2ew1MSw
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out at the beginning of  this paper according to which there is not a causal 
relationship between basic religious orientations, such as al-Wahhab’s 
interpretation of  tawh}i>d, and social and political action. PPMWI embraces 
these religious teachings. They are central to its collective identity. This 
does not, however, lead to the construction of  socially or politically 
exclusivist let alone violent identities as primordialist understandings 
of  Wahhabism current in Western and Indonesian discourse suggest. 
Indeed opposition to religious and political violence and support secular 
Indonesian nationalism are also essential elements of  PPMII identities. 
This indicates that there is not a “primordial” Wahhabi identity as polemic 
literature in Indonesian and western languages suggests. The claim that 
there is should be taken as an example of  “everyday primordialism.”
There are many other examples that indicate that religion serves 
to legitimate social and political action, but that basic religious teachings 
do not lead to particular forms of  social or political action. In Indonesia, 
there are Muslim groups, including the Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Front 
for the Defense of  Islam) rooted in supposedly peaceful sufi theologies 
that advocate and engage in violence against those it terms “theological 
deviants.” Tambiah has shown that Theravada Buddhism and Hinduism 
can be used to legitimize xenophobia, ethno-religious violence and state 
terrorism despite their doctrinal emphasis on non-violence.36 Roman 
Catholicism has been used to legitimize Mother Teresa’ selfless devotion 
to ameliorating the suffering of  the poorest of  the poor, and the terrors 
of  the Inquisition. Anabaptist Protestant Christianity motivated, mass 
slaughter during the 16th century wars of  religion as well as Amish 
pacifism.
This leads us to conclude that core religious teachings shape but 
do not determine personal and collective identities. Core theological 
teachings are one, but only one, of  the elements combined in the 
construction of  social identities through a complex form of  bricolage. 
Lévi-Strauss was less concerned with questions of  power and domination 
than subsequent generations of  French social scientists and philosophers, 
particularly Foucault who argues that the construction of  knowledge is 
shaped by power relationships. Primordialism is all too often an element 
36 S. Tambiah, Ethnonationalist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South Asia (Berkeley: 
University of  California Press, 1999), pp. 266-295.
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of  contentious political discourse caste in the guise of  scholarship. 
Promoting the idea that there are primordialist identities can a strategy 
for organizing difference in ways that justify conflict.
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